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NEUTRAL CONVOYS IN LAW AND PRACTICE

Benjamin Akzin *
The following study, based on law and past practice, :l:ims at clarifying the status of neutral convoys in relation to the problem of convoying
American supplies to Great Britain in the present war as it stood under
the Neutrality Act of 1939. The question at issue touches both upon
international law and American constitutional law. Both these aspects
are investigated in the following pages.

I
CONVOY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Past Practice
ONVOY, as the term is used in connection with maritime warfare,
is broadly defined by Hyde as referring "to the case where one
or more vessels are escorted by a public ship, which is commonly a
vessel of war." 1 The escorting, or convoying, of belligerent merchant
vessels by warships of their own nationality is an obvious measure of protection against attack by hostile warships, and is designed to increase
the chances of successful resistance to search or attack, rather than to
preclude search or attack under international law; as against this increased protection, sailing under such belligerent convoy entails the
risk of immediate attack by hostile warships, without benefit of the
special procedure provided for the capture of enemy merchant vessels.2
The question that has aroused special interest in international law
does not concern these belligerent convoys, but refers to convoys of
merchant vessels of neutral registry. The use of convoys in this connection had arisen, several centuries ago, as a means of safeguarding

C

* S. J. D., Harvard; of the Library of Congress; formerly instructor in Government, College of the City of New York, and Professor of Law, Portia Law School.-Ed.
1 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (1922). Cf. the clearer definition in I
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY, 8th ed., 673 ( 1914): "A naval force, under the command
of an officer appointed by the government, for the protection of merchant-ships and
others, during the whole voyage, or such part of it as is known to require such protection."
:! 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed. (Lauterpacht), 716 (1940);
VANSELow, VoELKERRECHT, § 226h (1931).
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neutral merchant vessels which do not carry contraband against abuses
of the belligerent rights of visit, search and capture. The practice grew
up at a time when contraband lists were limited in scope, and was designed to substitute the guarantee of the convoy's commander as to the
innocent character of the cargo and its destination for the procedures of
visit and search. The use of convoys in this sense grew after 1680, and
formed, throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, an
essential part of the so-called state of "armed neutrality." The matter
was not entirely free from controversy: Great Britain, the leading
maritime power, long maintained that despite neutral convoying, belligerents may exercise the right of visit and search; in 1909, on the •
occasion of the London Maritime Conference, she rallied to the generally held view concerning neutral convoys, but in July 19 I 6 she
went back to her traditional policy. However, the practice of Qther
States, incorporated in treaties and naval instructions and upheld by
authoritative writers, has become conclusive upon the point that, unless
grounds exist for serious suspicion, the belligerent warship's commander must accept the convoy's commander's assurance as to the convoyed ship, in lieu of visit and search.8
Prevailing opinion holds that a neutral merchant vessel, to be exempt from visit and search by a belligerent, must be under the convoy
of a warship of its own nationality. There is no prohibition in international law against the convoying of merchant vessels of a different
nationality, but assurance of the convoy commander as to the character
of the vessels of a nationality other than his own is not considered a
sufficient guarantee, and still exposes the vessels thus convoyed to
search and capture.4
Convoying neutral merchant vessels by belligerent warships is, of
8
A full history of neutral convoys in recent times will be found in SToEDTER,
FLoTTENGELEIT IM SEEKRIEG (1936), and in Gordon, "La visite des convois neutres,"
1934 REVUE GENERALE DE DR0IT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 566. For early instances of
convoys, see Jessup and Deak, "The Origins," I NEUTRALITY 200 and passim (1935).
For convoy as part of armed neutrality, see ScoTT, THE ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF
1780 AND 1800 (1918). For a history of convoy emphasizing the British viewpoint,
see HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 723-730 (1909). For a brief history of
convoy, see 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 708-710 (1940). For a
statement of the law relating to convoys as formulated by American authorities, see
7 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 1 204 ( 1906) ; and 2 HYDE, INTER•
NATIONAL LAW 457-458 (1922).
4
2 FAUCHILLE, TRArTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLic, 8th ed., § 1671 (1)
(1921). See, however, art. 43 of the Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of
Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law, 33 AM. J. INT. L. (Supp.) 516 (1939).
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course, no guarantee at all as far as the opposing belligerent is concerned. On the contrary, prevailing opinion holds that a neutral merchant vessel accepting belligerent convoy places itself thereby in the
position of a belligerent merchant vessel.5 However, the United States
in l 8 IO maintained its right to have its merchant vessels convoyed by
belligerent British warships, free from capture by belligerents hostile
to Great Britain. A treaty concluded in 1830 even acknowledged the
American claim to compensation arising out of the capture by Denmark
of American vessels thus convoyed, but a stipulation was made that the
solution then adopted could not be invoked as rule or precedent for the
future. 6
The all-inclusive character of modern contraband lists has deprived
the question of neutral convoys of much of its traditional meaning. The
aim of the belligerents in 1914 and now is no longer that of preventing certain articles specified as contraband from reaching the enemy, but
of interrupting the entire fl.ow of sea-borne commerce between the
enemy and third countries. With the consequent reduction of the scope
of noncontraband goods, convoys as a means of protecting noncontraband commerce have been deprived of their former importance. A
further complicating factor was the extension of "blockaded" zones to
include the entire coastlines of the belligerents and a large portion of
the high seas forming the approach to them. Convoys were never held
to be applicable to blockaded zones; hence, again, their e:ffectiveness
diminished. fo.nd finally, the entire character of naval war was changed
in 1914-1918 by the German practice of destroying merchant ships instead of capturing them and bringing them to port under a prize crew.
In face of British naval superiority and in view of the limitations of the
submarine and the airplane-the main instruments of German naval
war-destruction of vessels has become the prevailing German practice,
replacing the orderly procedures of search and capture, to cope with
which convoys had been previously in use.
In so far as neutral countries were concerned, these new conditions
confronted them with the task not only of preventing visit and search,
but of preventing attack and destruction of their merchant vessels.
Neutral convoy, with its traditional procedure of assuring the belligerents of the innocent character of ships and cargo, while still admis5
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sible under international law, was no longer equal to the situation. In
the war of 1914-1918, it was attempted only twice, and both times
with indifferent success.7 The United States, though invited by the
German government to convoy its merchant vessels proceeding to
England, made no use of this procedure. 8
Instead of convoying, neutral countries adopted other devices:
when induced to submit to the conditions of naval war imposed by the
belligerents, they permitted their merchant vessels to be inspected in
port previous to sailing by belligerent consular authorities, who would
provide them with "navicerts"; 0 in the case of the one neutral in the
last war that opposed the new conditions of naval warfare--the United
States-the arming of merchant vessels was resorted to as alternative
to convoy.10
7
Gordon, "La visite des convois neutres," 1934 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 566 at 577-585.
8
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1915
Supp., II5 (1928) (German note of February 16, 1915): "In order to meet in the
safest manner all the consequences of mistaking an American for a hostile merchant
vessel the German Government recommended that (although this would not apply
in the case of danger from mines) the United States convoy their ships carrying peaceable cargoes and traversing the English seat of maritime war in order to make them
recognizable. In this connection the German Government believe it should be made a
condition that only such ships should be convoyed as carry no merchandise which
would have to be considered as contraband according to the interpretation :ipplied
by England against Germany. The German Government are prepared to enter into
immediate negotiations with the American Government relative to the manner of
convoy."
9
2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 714 (1940).
10
The reasons for this preference are explained by Secretary of State LANs1NG,
WAR MEMOIRS 223-224 (1935):
"There were two principal methods that could be employed in warding off
submarines. One of these was by naval convoy, and the other by arming the merchant
vessels for defense. Both might be employed if it were expedient to do so. The convoying of cargo-bearing vessels passing through the danger zones was strongly opposed
by the chief officers of the Navy for the following reasons: The number of vessels
engaged in trade with the Allies was so large that it would have been impossible to
furnish enough cruisers and destroyers to convoy all vessels of American registry clearing from American ports even if the entire naval force were employed for that purpose.
The result would be that many of the vessels would lack protection. A convoyed neutral
vessel would not be subject to visit and search within or without the German war-zones,
because the presence of a neutral naval ship would operate as a guarantee that the vessel
was not carrying contraband goods. In view of the extensive lists of contraband issued
by the belligerents, no American merchant vessel sailed for a European port which did
not have in its cargo articles liable to seizure as contraband of war. A convoy in these
circumstances would be ineffective because the naval commander would be in honor
bound and compelled to disclose the nature of the cargo if interrogated by :i submarine commander, and in practically every case part or all of the cargo and in most
cases the vessel itself would be liable to seizure on account of the character of the trade
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B. Position of the United States in the Present War
While the extension of contraband lists has deprived the institution
of neutral convoy of its traditional meaning, a new purpose may have
been found for it by reason of the substitution by Germany of the
procedures of attack and destruction for the former procedures of visit,
search and capture, under which destruction of the vessels was permitted only after all crew and passengers have been brought in safety.11
A neutral is undoubtedly entitled to regard attack on and destruction
of its merchant vessels, even of its contraband-carrying and blockaderunning merchant vessels, as violation of international law, and may,
if it wishes, employ convoys to prevent the belligerent from engaging
in these practices.12 In the circumstances of the present war, it is not
likely that either the employment of such convoys or the arming of
nonbelligerent merchant vessels, whether American or other, would
induce Germany to re"-adopt search and capture and to cease attack
and destruction of nonbelligerent vessels. At any rate, in resisting
attack and destruction, the convoying ship or the armed merchant vessel
would be acting within its rights under international law.13
In accordance with these new conditions, current discussions of
convoying, without going into the matter very deeply, do not envisage convoy as a means of safeguarding noncontraband carrying vessels but rather consider it as a means of securing unhindered passage to
vessels carrying war material and other articles that undoubtedly conin which it was engaged. Another reason which influenced the Navy to oppose convoying was the imminence of war with Germany and the possibility that the beginning
of hostilities would find the Atlantic fleet scattered over the ocean instead of being
mobilized and prepared to defend the coast cities of the United States from attacks
by German cruisers or submarines.
"The other method suggested was the arming of merchant ships proceeding to
waters where they were liable to be attacked by German U-Boats without an attempt at
visit and search, as mere passing through those waters had been declared to be an
evidence of wrongful purpose and a sufficient ground for such attack. This method was
the one approved by officials expert in naval operations and conversant with the laws
of naval warfare and the rights of neutrals on the high seas. In accordance with their
decision and after an independent study of the question by the law officers of the Department of State, I issued on February eighth a public notification to the masters of
American merchant vessels that they might arm their vessels to resist submarine attacks
but that no naval convoy would be furnished them."
11. 2 FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 8th ed., § 1415
(1921).
12
This is the basis of Professor Seavey's suggestions, reported in the CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MoNITOR, March I 1, 1941, p. l 1.
11 See, on this point, the letter by Professor Sack, in the NEW YORK TIMES,
April 27, 1941, § {E, p. 10:5.
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stitute contraband. Taking a strictly legalistic view of this situation,
one would say, with Professor Seavey, that such convoys, under the
traditional rules of neutrality, would not be entitled to resist search
and capture of the convoyed vessels, but would be entitled to resist
attack and attempts to sink them. Taking a realistic attitude, one would
say that as long as the sea is dominated by Britain, the procedure of
search and capture would not be generally adopted by Germany, and
that, therefore, Germany would have the choice between letting the
convoyed vessels pass unhindered and braving armed conflict with the
convoy.
Assuming the latter, would the resulting situation be compatible
with neutrality? The answer is in the affirmative, even if neutrality is
understood in the sense of "impartiality" as between belligerents, a
sense given to it in the last two centuries. The procurement of war
supplies for Great Britain by the government of the United States
cannot be reconciled with this concept of neutrality, but the use of convoys to safeguard American shipping can easily be justified, provided,
of course, that convoys would not be used to prevent search and capture, or to prevent sinking after the crew has been put in safety, but
merely to resist attempted destruction without search or without having
brought the crew in safety. It should be noted, however, that it would
be for Germany to decide whether she prefers to consider such resistance a casus belli, to regard it as a justifiable action in defense of neutral
rights, or to consider it a violation of neutrality which she chooses to
ignore.
Still, arguing within the terms of "neutrality" as it was understood
in the last two centuries, the question arises how far away from her
shores the United States, as a neutral, may send convoys to protect
her merchant fleet against unwarranted attack. Neutral convoys of the
old variety, aiming at safeguarding noncontraband-carrying vessels
against visit and search, could exercise their functions anywhere on the
high seas, except within the zone of effective blockade.14 What constitutes effective blockade is, however, a point that has not been quite
settled.15 But even should the entire area announced by Germany and
Italy as being blockaded be considered such, it is doubtful whether the
restriction that applied formerly still applies. For the penalty of
blockade-running, under international law, is capture and confiscation
l4' See
15 See

7 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 1204, p. 493 ( 1906).
2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 639-640 (1940).

And

cf. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING MARITIME WARFARE, June

1917, §

III

(1924).
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of vessel and cargo,16 whereas the present German practice is that of
sinking the boat without placing its crew in safety. To protect one's
boats and crew against sinking, it may be argued that a neutral is entitled, under international law, to send convoying vessels even into the
zone of the blockade.
The implications of the "neutral" status of the United States in the
present conflict are not quite clear. The repeatedly declared policy
of the United States in this war is to give all aid to the countries "whose
defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States," 17
rather than to observe an attitude of "impartiality" as between rival
belligerents. And while the United States is neutral under the Neutrality Law of November 4, 1939 and the Presidential neutrality proclamations, the meaning of this neutrality has been considerably altered
by the legislative and executive acts of the United States.18
Under the circumstances, the question whether convoying of war
supplies to Great Britain is compatible with "neutrality" as it used to
be understood for the last two centuries, is perhaps not entirely relevant.10 It may be considered, indeed, that in following its conception of
the correct attitude of a nonbelligerent in the face of a war of aggression, the United States is performing acts which are called for by the
very spirit of the law of nations. Germany and Italy, the countries affected by these acts, might choose to regard these acts as violations of
law or as contrary to their interests, and to treat them as a casus belli.
But as long as this has not been done, and even the affected belligerents
regard our attitude as not inconsistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations, there is no ground for challenging their legitimacy
under international law. In the scale of the acts whose compatibility
with neutrality might have conceivably been questioned by Germany
and Italy, procuring war material for Great Britain out of the public
funds of the United States is certainly far more weighty an act than
16 See 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 650 (1940).
17

"Lend-Lease" Law, Act of March 11, 1941, Pub. L. 11, 77th Cong., 1st sess.
(1941), 22 U.S. C. A. (Supp. 1941), §§ 411-419. This emphasis has been further
strengthened in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, of August 1941.
18 See, for an attempt to justify this changed concept of neutrality, commonly
referred to as "nonbelligerency," the speech by Attorney General Jackson of the
United States at the First Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association, Havana,
Cuba, March 27, 1941, published in 27 A. B. A. J. 275 (1941).
19
Cf. Memorandum inserted by Senator Taft in 87 CoNG. REc., No. 61, p.
A1596 (1941): "Any objection to such convoy, however, cannot be based upon the
ground that it is unneutral or illegal. • • • If the lease-lend bill be passed, it is the
established policy of the United States declared through Congress to be unneutral."
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the sending of convoys to protect American vessels against sinking and
destruction of life.
An additional question would be raised, if American convoys were
to be used not merely to prevent indiscriminate sinking, but even further to prevent visit, search and capture of contraband-carrying or
blockade-running vessels. Such a procedure would be clearly incompatible with "neutrality" in the old sense of the term. Whether it
would fall within the framework of "nonbelligerency" as practiced in
this country at present is a matter of opinion. From a formal point of
view, any act of a third power is consistent with nonbelligerency, as long
as neither this power, nor the power unfavorably affected, chooses to
declare it an act of war.
All above considerations refer to the convoying of American merchant vessels by American warships. The convoying of merchant vessels of another neutral nationality by American warships would raise
no appreciable additional questions. While the neutral convoy of old
was understood to offer to the belligerent a sufficient guarantee against
contraband only if the convoying and the convoyed vessels were of the
same nationality, the question does not arise in the present circumstances. Just as several neutrals may combine their efforts to safeguard
their rights and interests by jointly protecting their territory, so also
may they combine to safeguard their ships and crews, either by placing
them under a mixed convoy, or by letting the warships of one of them
convoy merchant vessels of another.20 The belligerent affected would
not be likely to regard this case in any different light than a convoy
restricted to merchant vessels of the warship's own nationality.
A rather novel situation would occur should American warships be
detailed to convoy British merchant vessels. Convoying belligerent
merchant vessels by a neutral or nonbelligerent warship is a situation
without precedent, and any armed conflict between such warships and
belligerent forces, outside the neutral's territorial waters ( or, perhaps,
outside of the "Safety Zone" proclaimed by the American republics)
would certainly be inconsistent with traditional neutrality. Whether it
would be considered an act of war depends, of course, on the attitude of
the belligerent affected.
Having lost its former significance as a safeguard of noncontrabandcarrying vessels, convoying has become nothing more than a means to
ensure the safety of merchant vessels and their crews and passengers
against attack and sinking. Viewed in this light, convoying in the nar20

See infra, note 58.
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row sense of the word, i.e., the escorting of merchant vessels by warships, is only one of several possible devices. Another device to the
same effect is "patrolling," i.e., the stationing or cruising of warships
along a certain sea-area, such as seems to have been practiced of late
by naval and air units of the United States.
Strategically, patrolling may appear preferable to convoying where
the movement of ships along a given route is very frequent, as it allows
the preventive supervision and clearance of sea-lanes. From the point
of view of international law, patrolling in such conditions will appear
mainly as an extension of the well-known type of operations undertaken in certain dangerous areas to insure the safety of sea-borne commerce and for humanitarian purposes. Its best-known previous applications are those undertaken in Chinese waters to guard against piracy
and in the Atlantic and Caribbean to prevent slave-trade. Contrary to
the convoy of old, patrolling operations are not specifically concerned
with dangers arising out of war. If anything, the adoption of patrolling
as a specific means to safeguard sea-lanes from wartime dangers is an
innovation.
Viewed from the municipal angle, the ordering of the navy on
patrol duties is as much within the scope of the Commander in Chief's
authority as is convoying, except that the Navy Regulations do not
mention patrolling as a routine function of the navy. An important
point is that in patrolling sea-lanes, warships do not restrict their protection to merchant vessels of their own nationality as in the case of the
convoy of old, but clear the lanes for the benefit of vessels of all
nationalities which might desire to use them.

II
CONVOY IN LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. Scope of Executive Power
It remains to consider the status of naval convoy under the domestic
law and practice of the United States. Convoy in the old sense of
safeguarding noncontraband-carrying vessels against visit and search,
while less used in the United States than abroad, was nevertheless
generally regarded as a proper exercise of executive authority, and
not in need of congressional authorization. Section VII of the Naval
Instructions of June I 9 I 7 21 fully recognizes convoy as a standing in21 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNING MARITIME WARFARE, June

1917, § VII,

arts.

51-54 (1924).
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stitution in international law and instructs American naval officers on
the attitude to be taken toward convoys of foreign nations. The use of
convoys by the United States was also taken as a matter of course. Its
use and misuse were abundantly discussed in American diplomatic correspondence,22 and Secretary of State Forsyth, in a note to Mexico of
May r8, 1837, declared convoy to be not merely a neutral right, but
even a neutral duty:
"It is an ordinary duty of the naval force of a neutral during
either civil or foreign wars, to convoy merchant vessels of the
nation to which it belongs to the ports of the belligerents." 23
Under the circumstances, convoy is regarded so much of a routine
function of the navy that it was incorporated into the Navy Regulations
as a standing duty of American naval officers, without even the requirement of an order by the President or the Secretary of the Navy, as a
condition preliminary to undertaking specific convoy operations. Indeed, chapter r8, section 2, of the Navy Regulations deals with convoy
operations both in war and in peace.2 ¾ Regarding war-time ~onvoy, the
Regulations specify:
" The Commander in chief 25 shall afford protection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant vessels of the
United States and to those of allies."
Regarding convoy during a war between foreign nations, the Regulations state in more general terms, leaving large scope to the discretion
of the individual commanding officers: 26
"During a war between civilized nations with which the
United States is at peace, the commander in chief and all under
his command shall observe the laws of neutrality and respect
lawful blockade, but at the same time make every possible effort
that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve
and protect the lives and property of citizens of the United States
wherever situated."
The expression "wherever situated" is of special significance. Taken
at its literal meaning, it apparently means that the duties of naval
22
23

7

MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

§§ 1204, 1205 (1906).

Id., § l 204, p. 492.
2 ¾ United States Navy Regulations of 1920, c. 18, § 2, art. 714.
25 The "commander in chief" referred to here is not the President, but a naval
officer designated as such by the Navy Department. Cf. id., art. 679.
26
Id., art. 715.
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officers are not restricted to high-sea convoying, but may even call them
to intervene in blockaded zones and in foreign territorial waters.27
The same implication of extending convoy and protection to foreign
ports and territorial waters is found in article 726 of the Regulations,
dealing with the Navy's peace-time duties, and the context of which
lays down rules of behavior in foreign ports:
"So far as lies within their power, commanders in chief, didivision commanders, and commanding officers of ships shall
protect all merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and advance the commercial interests of this country,
always acting in accordance with international law and treaty
obligations."
This clearly indicates that convoy was never regarded as a matter
calling for Congressional legislation, but was left in its state of a matter
within the purview of the President and his subordinates in the Executive branch.28 In fact, of all the powers which the President has wielded
as organ of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief, and of which
many gave occasion to protracted disputes, none was ever so little questioned as his power to order American warships to convoy duty.
Is the situation different when it comes to convoying vessels carrying war-supplies to Great Britain in the present war? At first glance,
it appears that two significant distinctions could be made between the
convoy-project under discussion, and former convoys. One distinction
consists in the character of the cargo of the vessels to be convoyed.
Convoys of old were intended to safeguard vessels not carrying contraband, or at least, the contraband character of whose cargo was a
matter of dispute; in the present case, the contraband character of the
supplies is not contested. The other ground for distinction, frequently
mentioned in the course of Congressional and public discussions and
set out at length in an interesting memorandum submitted by Senator
21 Regarding the qualifying clause which requires that the efforts be consistent
with international law, cf. supra, p. 10.
28 Certain parts of the Navy Regulations were passed originally by Congress or
were subsequently incorporated into legislative acts. See 34 U.S. C. (1934 and Supp.).
These parts of the Regulations cannot be changed without Congressional action. But
convoy never belonged to them. The only mention of convoys up to the Lend-Lease
Act of March II, 1941, in any legislative act, occurs in connection with navigation
lights of foreign convoys. 33 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 83, 182. United States convoys are
not mentioned in any statute. Consequently, all matters regarding convoys may be
further determined by the Executive, i.e., by the Secretary of the Navy with the approval of the President, in accordance with the Act of July 14, 1862, § 5, 12 Stat.
L. 565; 34 U.S. C. (1934), § 591.
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Taft,29 concerns the likelihood that the presently discussed convoy
would lead to war, whereas-so runs the argument-the convoys of
old carried no such implications; hence--it is argued-permitting the
Executive to order American warships on convoy duty would amount
in the circumstances to an Executive infringement of the constitutional
prerogative of Congress to declare war.
The first distinction has not yet been accorded much attention. The
Taft memorandum appears to take the view that this distinction alone
would not suffice to take the decision as to convoying out of the hands
of the Executive. This seems indeed to be the correct view, for the
purpose of a convoy is essentially to protect the lawful maritime commerce of a country against foreign armed forces. What constitutes lawful commerce is determined, for all authorities within the United States,
by domestic law. As long as the United States is content to remain a
neutral impartial as between all belligerents, and is taking its stand
on the basis of the rights and duties which such a status entails-convoy may be used within this framework only. But with the change of
the neutrality conception of the United States to that of a nonbelligerency which discriminates between rival belligerents and deems the
defense of some of them vital to the defense of the United States, convoy rests on as sound a basis, from the point of view of domestic law,
in escorting war supplies, as it had rested previously in escorting noncontraband material. To the above should be added the other function
of convoys: that of safeguarding American vessels against destruction
of the lives of their crews in violation of the procedures of orderly capture which the United States has a right to insist upon as applicable to
its merchant fleet, independently of the character of the cargo.

B. Relation of Executive and Congressional Powers
The other ground for distinction is developed at length in the Taft
memorandum. The general conclusion reached in that memorandum
is that
"each situation must stand alone. If the action to be taken will
not result in war, the President's authority as Commander in
Chief may be sufficient. . .. On the other hand, if war would be
the probable result of the employment of armed forces, Congress
must take action. Otherwise, the power conferred upon Congress
to declare war is a lifeless and futile thing." 30
29

87 CoNG. REc. No: 61, p. A1596-A1599 (1941).
Id., p. A1599. Before dealing in detail with the arguments of the memorandum, a not unimportant error of fact must be pointed out; the memorandum assumes
110
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The memorandum bases this conclusion on several judicial decisions and on a survey of the practice. A careful perusal of the quoted
decisions indicates that only one of them bears on the issue of limiting
the President's powers as Commander in Chief: the case of Little v.
Barreme. 81 The decision in this case, while it does not deal specifically
with convoys, deems illegal the seizure of a French vessel by an American warship on the high seas, and the commander is declared answerable for damages arising out of his having obeyed a Presidential instruction not in conformity with an act of Congress. The case is complicated by the fact that the manner of seizure of French vessels at the
time was regulated by an act of Congress which Chief Justice Marshall,
in his opinion, interprets as having been intended as exhaustive,82 but
nevertheless the case affords strong evidence in support of the contention that the Executive cannot go beyond existing Congressional enactments by exercising concurrently his powers of Commander in Chief.
Whether the rationale of the decision still holds good in the absence
of Congressional enactments, as is notably the case in the convoy contingency, is another question, upon which disagreement is well possible.
The other judicial decisions quoted in the memorandum do not
add anything to the weight of its thesis. None of these decisions refers
to convoys. None of them involves the question of Presidential powers.
In two of these cases, Bas v. Tingy 88 and Talbot v. Seeman,8 4 the decisions merely tell us that Congress may enact measures amounting to
"partial war" as well as declare full war, all of which has very little
bearing on the question of the scope of the President's powers as Comthat convoying of noncontraband carrying vessels entails no risk of war. The contrary
is true. Convoy in the old form has given rise to a great many armed conflicts. See
Phillips and Reed, "The Napoleonic Period," 2 NEUTRALITY 94 ff. (1936). And
see infra. p. 14.
81
2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 170 (1804).
82
" • • • the legislature seem to have prescribed that the manner in which this
law shall be carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound
to a French port.•.•" 2 Cranch 170 at 177-178.
Previously, Chief Justice Marshall remarks: "It is by no means clear, that the
President • . . might not, without any special authority for that purpose, in the then
existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of
the United States, to seize and send into port.•.•" Id. 177. This seems to indicate
that a different decision would have been arrived at, had Congress not limited by
legislation the scope of Presidential discretion in this instance. Marshall's attitude is
particularly interesting in view of the constitutional provision giving the Congress
power to "make rules concerning captures on land and water." U. S. Constitution, art.

I, § 8.
83
84

4 Dall. (4 U. S.) 37 (1800).
1 Cranch (5 U. S.) I (1801).
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mander in Chief. Of the other cases, Fleming v. Page,8 5 which tells
us that the President may not extend the boundaries and laws of the
United States to new territories, has even less to do with the thesis of
the memorandum, whereas Justice Grier's opinion in the Prize Cases,8 6
if anything, might rather be cited in support of vast Presidential
powers.
As for the practice of the United States, the memorandum summarizes it as follows:
" ... In the many instances where danger of war was minimal,
the Executive has acted alone. But when Mexico, a stronger
nation, was involved, congressional authorization was obtained.
This authorization need not be a formal declaration-it may be
authorization only to act in a manner that will probably involve
the Nation in a war. This type of authorization was obtained in
the Mexican war of I 846. . .. The Spanish-American war was
initiated in the same manner." 37
This statement can be hardly accepted as a fair summary of the
practice of the United States, not even of such instances in this practice which have been cited in the memorandum. Regarding convoy
proper, there is not a single instance in the history of this country of
specific Congressional action having preceded the ordering of warships
to convoy duty, though the Taft memorandum itself quotes one instance of convoy which was far from peaceful, having resulted in ships
being captured and burned by the convoy,38 and though in another
instance convoying operations threatened to develop into an armed
conflict with the leading naval power in the world.39
But leaving convoys aside, can it be said that preliminary Congressional approval was the rule in those cases where the Executive was
about to engage in a hazardous foreign policy likely to result in an
armed conflict against a serious rival? Or could it be said, at least, that
preliminary Congressional approval was the rule when the Executive
was about to take the initiative of using force in foreign territory?
35

9 How. (50 U. S.) 603 (1850).
2 Black. (67 U. S.) 635 at 668 (1862).
87
87 CoNG. REc., No. 61, p. A1599 (1941).
38
See the incidents of Miconi and Andros Islands, in Greece, October 1827, in
OFFUTT, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES 17-20 ( 1928). These incidents were also interesting as precedents for American warships convoying British vessels while the United States was at peace.
89
See infra, at note 43, for President Buchanan's action in 18 58.
86
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Offutt,40 in his study of the use of armed force abroad, also cited in
the Taft memorandum, enumerates seventy-six instances, not of a
hazardous policy that might lead to armed conflicts, but of actual use
of force in foreign territory-by far the most serious procedure imaginable-with hardly any instances of preliminary Congressional approval.
But if it is not the likelihood or the reality of an armed conflict
in itself that makes Congressional approval necessary, could it be that
the importance of the prospective antagonist makes a difference? This
view appears rather unusual: that the scope of the respective powers of
Congress and of the President in the field of foreign relations should
depend on the size or the strength of a prospective enemy is a somewhat novel conception, difficult to explain in terms of constitutional
theory. However that may be, let us examine the practice. In support
of this conception, the Taft memorandum cites two cases: that of the
Mexican war of 1846, and that of the Spanish-American war of 1898,
both growing out of the use of armed force by the Executive with Congressional approval. It should be noted that in either case, the use of
force involved actual penetration of foreign territory by American
armed forces. But even in this limited field, the practice is not conclusive: far later than the Mexican war of 1846 occurred the incident
of Vera Cruz in 1914,41 in which President Wilson, even after having
asked for Congressional approval for his intended use of force against
Mexico, did not wait for the decision of Congress, but had American
troops land in Mexico and overcome active opposition before Congress
had passed its resolution. This procedure clearly indicates that in the
opinion of President Wilson the approval of Congress, while desirable
in connection with a political action of this magnitude, is not constitutionally required.42
But the most interesting cases were those two in which the United
States authorities took action that involved a risk of war with really firstclass powers. In both cases action has been taken without any resort
to Congressional authorization. They involved, respectively, the British
Empire and the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and are therefore con40

OFFUTr, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES (1928). See also the list contained in 87 CONG. REc., No. 128, p.

6056 (1941).
41

Id. 118 ff.
The Taft memorandum cites this case in support of the theory of a need for
Congressional approval, and solves the difficulty by explaining that a resolution justifying the use of force was passed, and adding: "It appears that the armed forces landed
the day before." 87 CoNG. REc., No. 61, p. A1599 (1941).
42
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elusive evidence that the powers of the Executive were not, in law,
regarded as varying with their application to weaker or to stronger
nations, and that the Executive's power to conduct foreign relations is
not subject to the reservation of refraining from acts which may conceivably lead to war. The two cases are of particular interest in this
connection, because one of them involves the use of convoys and illustrates the di:fference between naval convoys and landing of forces
abroad, while the other has given occasion to a judicial pronouncement
regarding the extent of Executive power.
The one case is that of President Buchanan, who, after a protracted
controversy with Great Britain over the latter's practice of searching
American vessels in time of peace, ordered, in 1858, a naval force to
the Cuban waters with directions "to protect all vessels of the United
States on the high seas from search or detention by the vessels of war
of any other nation." 43 This action was undertaken without Congressional authority and a conflict was only avoided by Britain's abandonment of her practice.44
The particular importance of this precedent lies not only in the
fact that the convoy of 1858 was designed to stop an unfriendly practice of a leading Great Power, and must have been undertaken, therefore, in the knowledge that war might follow, but also in the personality
of James Buchanan. Indeed, President Buchanan was particularly
cautious in exercising his powers; in a message to Congress he stated:
" ... Without the authority of Congress the Executive can not
lawfully direct any force, however near it may be to the scene of
difficulty, to enter the territory of Mexico, Nicaragua, or New
Granada for the purpose of defending the persons and property
of American citizens, even though they may be violently assailed
whilst passing in peaceful transit over, the Tehuantepec, Nicaragua or Panama routes. He can not, without transcending his constitutional power, direct a gun to be :fired into a port or land a
seaman or marine to protect the lives of our countrymen on shore
or to obtain redress for a recent outrage on their property...." 45
Whilst imposing upon himself these scrupulous restrictions regarding the use of force in foreign territory, restrictions which other
43
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Presidents, Congress and the Courts failed to maintain, President
Buchanan nevertheless thought it in order to undertake convoying
movements on the high seas which might have conceivably led to war.
The other significant incident demonstrates the extent to which not
only the President, but even subordinate executive officers, possess the
power to use force in defense of American interests, even though this
use of force may involve the country in a war against a Great Power.
This is the instance of Captain Ingraham's intervention in favor of
Martin Koszta, in I 853.46 Captain lngraham's action, far from being
criticized as ultra vires, subsequently received Congressional commendation and was cited with approval by Justice Miller, speaking for the
Supreme Court in In re Neagle,4 1 as follows:
"One of the most remarkable episodes in the history of our
foreign relations, and which has become an attractive historical
incident, is the case of Martin Koszta, a native of Hungary, who,
though not fully a naturalized citizen of the United States, had
in due form of law made his declaration of intention to become a
citizen. While in Smyrna he was seized by command of the Austrian consul general at that place, and carried on board the Hussar,
an Austrian vessel, where he was held in close confinement. Captain Ingraham, in command of the American sloop of war St.
Louis, arriving in port at that critical period, and ascertaining that
Koszta had with him his naturalization papers, demanded his surrender to him, and was compelled to train his guns upon the
Austrian vessel before his demands were complied with. It was,
however, to prevent bloodshed, agreed that Koszta should be
placed in the hands of the French consul subject to the result of
diplomatic negotiations between Austria and the United States.
The celebrated correspondence between Mr. Marcy, Secretary
of State, and Chevalier Hillsemann, the Austrian minister at
Washington, which arose out of this affair and resulted in the
release and restoration to liberty of Koszta, attracted a great deal
of public attention, and the position assumed by Mr. Marcy met
the approval of the country and of Congress, who voted a gold
medal to Captain Ingraham for his conduct in the affair. Upon
what act of Congress then existing can any one lay his finger in
support of the action of our government in this matter?"

" 6 BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES

(1920).
47 135

U.S. I

at 64,

IO S.

Ct. 658 (1889).
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C. Use of Convoys in the Present Crisis
In the light of the practice of the United States, thus reviewed, it
seems that the Executive possesses full powers of using the armed
forces of the nation in the interests of the United States for actions
short of war, and that such actions include not only the procedure
of convoy, which, after all, entails no initiative of force and no interference with foreign territorial sovereignties, but even procedures that
go further, entail the initiative of force and constitute interference with
foreign territorial sovereignty. This conclusion as to the practice does
not necessarily imply that the practice is very wise or satisfactory. In
those foreign countries where the Executive is politically responsible
to the Legislature, the dangers inherent in too drastic a foreign policy
and too drastic a use of armed force on the part of the Executive are
reduced to a minimum by the weapon of interpellation and the risk
of a vote of nonconfi.dence. Under the separation of powers doctrine
prevailing in this country, there exists no such remedy, and, whatever
the voluntary limitations which a cautious President will impose upon
himself, law and long practice leave him free to use force in the interests of the United States as long as he does not qualify this use of
force as an act of war.
This conclusion is also shared by Berdahl 48 and the numerous
writers cited by him, by Corwin,49 and-with particular appositeness
in view of the reliance which the Taft memorandum places upon himby Offutt.50 A series of judicial decisions confirm this conclusion, with
48

BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF 'niE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES

43-77

(1920).
49
50

CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS

154-198, 240-254 (1940).

OFFUTT, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

4-6 (1928):
" ••• Congress alone, of course, has the right to declare war under the Constitution, but interposition for the protection of citizens is not essentially war; and although such interposition may easily lead to war, in the experience of the United
States it has seldom done so. So long as the use of the army and navy of the United
States for the protection of citizens resident in foreign countries does not amount to a
recognized act of war, it seems to be an established fact that the President does, constitutionally, possess the power to make such use of those forces, and that Congress, except indirectly, as by disbanding the army and navy, may not prevent or render
illegal his action. . • •
"As it is obvious that the use of force for the protection of citizens abroad may
easily involve the United States in a situation destructive to its prestige among other
powers, or one from which it may extricate itself only by war, and since the President,
as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the behavior of those
forces, it would seem that the burden of responsibility for such situations as might arise
must fall upon him. What has generally happened in the past is that naval officers
UNITED STATES
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the matter being most comprehensively dealt with by Justice Nelson, in
Durand v. Hollins. 51 And, finally, this view underlies articles 722 to
724 of the Navy Regulations, in which the duties of naval officers
involving the use of force abroad or against foreign countries are specified, as well as articles 679, 714 and 71 5, quoted above. In none of
these cases can a distinction be found that would be based on the greater
or lesser likelihood of war, or on the greater or lesser strength of the
prospective adversary. Obviously, such distinctions are important political considerations which any Executive will do well to take into
account, either in determining whether or not to use force, or in deciding whether or not to strengthen his hands by obtaining Congressional approval. But the contention that either of these factors constitutes a distinction in law cannot be substantiated.
For the sake of completeness, and without necessary bearing on
the question of convoys, it should be pointed out, however, that two
pronouncements by Presidents of the United States lend support to
the thesis that certain acts of force or of policy that might lead to war
may not be carried out without Congressional approval. The first of
these pronouncements, by President Buchanan, concerning the occupation of foreign territory, has been quoted above. The other one, while
not cited by any one in the present discussion, is somewhat akin to the
reasoning of the Taft memorandum and supplies it with the strongest
support yet adduced. It is a letter by President Wilson to Secretary of
State Lansing, of February 15, 1917,52
commanding ships or squadrons on foreign stations have taken such action as they
believed necessary for the protection of American lives and property, and have reported their action to the Secretary of the Navy after their government has been committed to their procedure."
Offutt seems to go so far as to deny the opportunity for Congress to limit Presidential freedom of action in this direction, by legislating on the issue. In the light of
the constitutional provision authorizing Congress "to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces" (art. I, § 8) and of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Little v. Barreme, z Cranch (6 U. S.) 170 (1804), discussed supra at note
3 z, he takes a rather debatable stand.
51
4 Blatchf. 451, 8 F. Cas. l II (1860). This decision, as well as other decisions
of a similar character, deal with the use of force for the specific purpose of protecting
citizens, but it seems correct to follow the Taft memorandum in not distinguishing
between the occasions for the use of force by the Executive on the basis of their specific
purpose. What matters is that the force be used in the protection of the lawful interest
of the United States, of which the protection of its citizens is the most usual instance.
Cf. also The Prize Cases, z Black (67 U. S.) 635 at 668 (1862); In re Neagle,
135 U.S. lat 64, IO S. Ct. 658 (1889): and the quotation supra, note 32.
52
l LANSING PAPERS, 1914-1920 (PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES) 607 (1939). Senator Saulsbury had introduced a
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Two obstacles to convoying American vessels to belligerent countries are raised by the Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939, as at present applied. This act, as currently interpreted, does not preclude the
freedom of movement of convoying warships, but rather that of the
merchant vessels to be convoyed. One of the provisions of that act prohibits, with certain reservations, transportation of men and material to
belligerents, admits of no exceptions and is to end only after the State
in question shall have been announced by Presidential proclamation
to be a belligerent no longer:
''Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation
under the authority of section r (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any
articles or materials to any state named in such proclamation."
"Whenever any proclamation issued under the authority of section I (a) shall have been revoked with respect to any state the
provisions of this section shall thereupon cease· to apply with respect to such state, except as to o:ffenses committed prior to such
revocation." 53
The other restriction concerns the sailing of American vessels into
combat areas and is susceptible of regulation by Executive authority:
"Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation
under the authority of section I (a), and he shall thereafter
resolution authorizing the President to discriminate by proclamation in favor of certain
belligerents by allowing them full use of the ports of the United States. The President,
asked to comment on this resolution, wrote as follows:
"My dear Mr. Secretary: The proclamation by the President here contemplated
would, in effect, be a proclamation of outlawry against the naval representatives of a
Government with which this Government would be at peace, and would beyond all
doubt be considered so unfriendly an act as virtually to amount to a declaration of war.
To vest such power in the President would, therefore, be in fact (whatever the theory.
or intention of the Act) to depute to him the power to declare war. That would clearly
be unconstitutional, virtually if not technically, and I think very much better and more
direct ways of bringing on war would be preferable to this .••."
As can be seen, President Wilson imposed upon himself a. limitation far more
strict than that advocated in the Taft memorandum, and declined to make use of a
resolution which, if passed, would have amounted to the kind of "authorization"
recommended in the memorandum. This scrupulous respect for the rights of Congress
only serves to emphasize President Wilson's conviction that, in ordering the armament
of the merchant fleet by simple executive order, he acted within the scope of his constitutional authority. It will be noted that the arming of merchant vessels is, in effect,
an alternative for convoying them and that, intrinsically, it is by far the more radical
alternative, for virtually it increases the armed forces of the United States beyond the
volume authorized by Congress. Compared to this procedure, convoy by regular armed
forces of the United States is by far a minor matter.
53
54 Stat. L. 4 (1939), § 2 (a), (e); 22 U.S.C. (Supp. 1939), § 245j-1 (a), (e).
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find that the protection of citizens of the United States so requires,
he shall, by proclamation, define combat areas, and thereafter it
shall be unlawful, except under such rules and regulations as may
be prescribed, for any citizen of the United States or any American vessel to proceed into or through any such combat area. The
combat areas so defined may be made to apply to surface vessels or
aircraft, or both." 54
This latter restriction opposes no absolute bar to the sailing of vessels to Great Britain and other belligerent countries, for the "rules and
regulations" may always make provision for vessels proceeding under
convoy; but the prohibition contained in the section first quoted would
still apply, and this prohibition cannot be repealed save by a Presidential proclamation announcing that the foreign State is no longer in
a state of war, or by legislative action. 55
Lastly, what would be the status, under American law, of American armed forces ordered to convoy vessels of British and other foreign
registry?
The Navy Regulations in force at present, and serving as standing
instruction for naval commanders in the absence of specific directions
by the President or the Secretary of the Navy, do not contemplate the
convoying of foreign vessels except in the case of "allied" vessels when
the United States is at war. Therefore, convoying foreign vessels would
require an order by the President or the Secretary of the Navy. This
order could be given either as a specific instruction, or it could be incorporated in the standing Regulations, under the procedure outlined
in the Act of July r4, r862. 56
Would the issuance of such instructions be ultra vires of the Executive? It does not seem so. Aside from the precedent of convoying a
British vessel in r827, 51 we must realize that the reason for convoying
is the defense of the lawful interests of the convoying country. Protection of the citizens' lives and property is the most important and
54

Id., § 3 (a).

55

Requested by the Secretary of State to pass on the scope of the Presidential
Proclamations issued under § l (a), the Attorney General, in an opinion dated
August 29, 1941, held that the Proclamation stating that a state of war exists between
the United Kingdom and Germany is "to be construed as including only England,
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and not the overseas territories and possessions
of the British Empire." This opinion, based on arguments referring to the internal law
of the United Kingdom, does not pay sufficient attention to the specific connotation
of the term "United Kingdom" in connection with the relevant issue of belligerence.
56 See supra, note 28.
57 0FFU'IT, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

UNITED STATES 19 (1928).
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most frequent interest involved, but by no means the only one. It
would be quite in order, for instance, to go back to the practices of
early "armed neutrality" and to have an arrangement between several
neutral nations, e.g., between several American republics, regarding
mutual convoying. 58 In view of recent precedents regarding international agreements bearing on defense matters, such an arrangement
would seem to lie within the scope of matters open for regulation by
Executive Agreement.
On the other hand, the defense of certain belligerent countries in
the present war, including Great Britain, having been pronounced
"vital to the defense of the United States" by an Act of Congress, the
protection of the shipping of these belligerents seems to constitute a
sufficiently important interest to the United States to warrant, in law,
the use of convoys to assure its success, provided convoying appears
advisable from a political and military point of view.
The above does not imply that a decision to convoy vessels of a
belligerent country should be treated in every respect on the same
footing• as a decision to convoy vessels of other nonbelligerents. As
stated befoi:e, important consequences may be attached, by foreign
nations affected by this measure, to a decision of a nonbelligerent to
convoy vessels of a belligerent hostile to these nations. Should the
nations affected choose to declare that this decision, or any armed conflicts resulting from this decision, renders the convoying country a
hostile belligerent, their contention may have good grounds in international law. What should be noted in this connection is merely that
the domestic law of the United States does not oppose any objection
to a decision of this nature, if either Congress or the Executive should
desire to make it.
The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941,59 does not in any way add
to or detract from the previously existing authority to order the armed
forces of the United States to convoy duty. Section 3 (d) of the act
states:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the
United States."
58
Cf. Jessup and Deak, "The Origins," I NEUTRALITY passim (1935); Carpenter, "The United States and the League of Neutrals of I 780," I 5 AM. J. INT.
L. 511 (1921). For·a collection of documents regarding such arrangements, see ScoTT,
THE ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF 1780 AND 1800 (1918).
59
Pub. L. 11, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), 22 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1941), §§

411-419.
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The Taft memorandum, commenting upon this provision, correctly
explains:
"Such language merely indicated that Congress was content to
allow matters to rest in its present condition under the regulations
of the Secretary of the Navy and the power of the President as
Commander in Chief." 60
To this it is merely necessary to add that all considerations applicable to the use of the Navy for convoy duty would seem equally to
apply to the use for the same purpose of the air forces of the United
States, over which the President, deputed respectively by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, holds the same powers of Commander
in Chief.
The above study does not purport to pronounce on the desirability
or otherwise of convoying supplies to Great Britain, nor does it intend
to convey an opinion as to whether the issue of convoying may be better
decided by the Executive alone or form the subject of legislative action.
It is the sole aim of this study to analyze the convoy issue, as it presents
itself under the conditions of the present war, and to determine its
status under the law of nations and of the United States.
60

87 CoNG. REc., No. 61, p. A1598 (1941).

